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Abstract
How much and why do political parties emphasize Europe in election campaigns? The
literature is increasingly focusing on two aspects of party issue competition: position
and salience. However, recent studies on salience tend to ignore the fact that Europe is
a compound political issue. This article contributes to the debate by highlighting the
crucial difference between constitutive and policy-related European issues. Using data
from the Euromanifestos Project for 14 EU member states for the period 1979–2009,
we first show that Europe is much more salient in European Parliament elections than
previously assumed. Second, EU issue salience depends on party position and party
system polarization over European integration. However, different explanations
come into play once we bring in the polity-vs.-policy distinction. This has important
implications for our understanding of party competition on European integration.
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Introduction: Disentangling European integration
By now, it is no longer contested that European integration has become an object
of public controversy in party politics. The politicization of Europe – to take up the
term revitalized by Hooghe and Marks (2009) to capture this phenomenon – might
vary over time and across countries, but it is here to stay and likely to shape the
future course of integration. Moving beyond questions of whether and to what
extent Europe has become politicized, current studies are starting to focus on the
‘differentiated’ forms such politicization takes (e.g. de Wilde et al., 2016; Hutter
et al., 2016a; Risse, 2015). A recurring distinction is drawn between conflicts over
constitutive and policy-related European issues. According to Bartolini (2005: 310),
the former centre on fundamental features of the EU polity, i.e. membership,
competencies and decision-making rules. The latter, by contrast, refer to policy
questions in fields where EU institutions are involved in daily policy-making.
As astute observers argue (Mair, 2000, 2007; Risse, 2010), debating the two
types of European issue impacts the future of the EU and democracy in Europe
in two different ways. In his influential work on integration and party competition,
Mair’s (2000, 2007) hunch is that the EU’s institutional setting favours conflicts
over constitutive topics, which ultimately undermines the system’s legitimacy
because most controversies take the form of principled support vs. principled
opposition. He suggests that a mechanism to avoid more conflict over the funda-
mentals of the EU polity is a division of labour between national and European
elections. The European Parliament (EP) has become co-responsible for policy
decisions at the EU level, but it plays a less pivotal role in treaty reforms or the
accession of new member states. Thus, Mair advocates that EP elections should
become the arena for contesting European policies, whereas national elections
should centre on constitutive issues. Similarly, Risse (2010) calls for more debates
over which EU policies are preferable. In his opinion, ‘politicizing European poli-
cies is likely to lead to transnational disputes and, thus, to further create a
European community of communication’ (Risse, 2010: 251).
This article presents the first systematic large-N longitudinal study on the sali-
ence of these two essential types of European issue. Despite strong normative
claims, such a study is still lacking. Following Mair’s argument, we start to disen-
tangle ‘Europe’ in the context of EP elections. Thus, our main research questions
are as follows: How salient are constitutive and policy-related European issues in
EP elections? Do the conditions differ under which the two types of issue are
salient? By taking issue salience, a key component of politicization (Green-
Pederson, 2012), as our dependent variable, we contribute to a growing body of
literature on the salience of Europe in party competition (e.g. Adam and Maier,
2011; de Vries and van de Wardt, 2011; Guinaudeau and Persico, 2013; Hoeglinger,
2016; Kriesi, 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007; Pennings, 2006; Spoon, 2012;
Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015). This literature
has not yet systematically incorporated the distinction between the two types of
issue. Moreover, our general knowledge about the salience of Europe in EP elec-
tions is still fairly limited. In the most thorough study to date, Spoon (2012) shows
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that – in contrast to predictions of the ‘second order election’ thesis (Reif and
Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005) – parties devote a significant part of their EP election
manifestos to European issues. However, her work shares the limitation of other
studies in the field as it only focuses on constitutive aspects of integration.
We argue that taking into account the ‘polity-vs-policy’ distinction affects the
answers to both how salient Europe is in EP elections (even more salient than
previously assumed) and why certain parties are more likely to emphasize it.
More specifically, we focus on the effects of two party-level factors (i.e. positions
on and intra-party dissent over European integration), and polarization over the
issue in the party system. The standard expectations are that Euro-critical and
united parties have the most to gain from emphasizing Europe and that its systemic
salience increases with the polarization in the party system as a whole. These
expectations are based on the idea that Europe is a ‘wedge issue’ (van de Wardt
et al., 2014). That is, orientations towards Europe cut across the traditional left-
right divide (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008). This offers an
opportunity for challengers to mobilize against the pro-European consensus in
the party system and to produce severe intra-party conflict within mainstream
parties (e.g. de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). However, as
we argue in this article, this might only be the case for constitutive EU issues. By
contrast, positions on policy-related EU issues are usually embedded in the left-
right conflict (e.g. Hix et al., 2007). Taking this into account opens up a different
perspective on the dynamics of EU issue competition as parties not only face the
trade-off between emphasizing European or national issues but they can also shift
attention to policy-related European topics.
To test our expectations, we use a new integrated data set from the
Euromanifestos Project for 14 EU member states and the period 1979–2009 (see
Braun et al., 2015). As the coding scheme of this project is adapted to EP elections,
the data offer an ample basis for studying the compound nature of European
issues. Altogether, we study 401 Euromanifestos and explore the determinants of
the salience of the two types of EU issues both separately and in combination,
employing regression analysis with a Prais–Winsten transformation technique.
Overall, our findings show that a differentiated conceptualization of EU issues
has important implications for the understanding of party competition in EP elec-
tions. Europe is much more salient and different explanatory factors come into play
once we bring in the polity-vs-policy distinction. Most importantly, constitutive
issues are emphasized by Euro-critical parties, while policy issues are put on the
agenda by Euro-friendly parties and in less polarized contexts.
The salience of Europe: Emphasizing what and why?
The ‘what’: EU polity and policy contestation
Scholars of EU politics increasingly put the spotlight on the salience of Europe in
party competition. Although they focus on different arenas and rely on various
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data sources, such as expert surveys (e.g. de Vries and van de Wardt, 2011;
Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015), media coverage
(e.g. Helbling and Tresch, 2011; Kriesi, 2007) or party manifestos (e.g. Popa and
Dumitrescu, 2015; Spoon, 2012), they treat European integration as a single pol-
itical issue. That is, they do not differentiate between particular aspects or types of
European issues. More specifically, the literature tends to focus on the ‘constitutive’
side of integration. This is most obvious in Spoon’s (2012) analysis of
Euromanifestos – which comes closest to the study we present here. Spoon looks
at the percentage of a party manifesto devoted to EU issues by relying on the so-
called EUSUM variable, which includes ‘items such as favourable mentions of the
EC/EU, competencies of various European institutions, and mentions of a
European way of life’. The media-based study by Kriesi (2007) also focuses on a
single category: statements on ‘European integration (including enlargement) or
EU membership’. In the case of expert surveys, it is not so easy to tell. However,
the phrasing of the question1 is most likely to evoke judgement of the relative
importance of European integration regarding its constitutive elements, or very
general statements related to integration rather than regarding daily policy-
making.
At the same time, we know from more exploratory research that parties address
European policies in their programmatic statements as well. In an early automated
content analysis of national election manifestos, Pennings (2006), for example,
shows that although the share of co-mentions of 20 policy areas and European
integration is relatively low, there are pronounced party- and time-differences.2
Similarly, Guinaudeau and Persico (2013) highlight that the specific European
issues addressed vary greatly between election manifestos. Based on a qualitative
reading of British, French and German manifestos, they identify 69 issue categories
(ranging from very specific policy proposals to general integration-related state-
ments). On average, 8.7% of the content of the manifestos issued in the period
1986–2009 was devoted to EU issues. Furthermore, roughly 60% of these contents
referred to specific EU policies (own calculation). Two other recent studies have
also taken up the ‘policy’ vs ‘polity’ distinction. For the case of Austria, Senninger
and Wagner (2015) show that parties addressed European issues in about 9% of
their press releases during national election campaigns in 2008 and 2013. Most
importantly, all parties addressed EU policies to a fairly large extent (the two
mainstream parties in government talked about such issues in more than 50% of
their press releases). Based on a larger sample of 61 national elections in six West
European countries, Hutter et al. (2016b) find that, on average, EU policies
account for around 2% of all party statements reported in the media (the average
salience of all European issues is 6.6%). They show that, in relative terms, policy
issues are less salient than constitutive issues in all the countries (the differences are
smaller in EU member states compared to the non-EU member Switzerland).
To sum up, we can draw three conclusions from this exploratory work. First,
even in the case of national elections, we lose a significant share of EU-related party
contestation if we do not consider policy issues. In other words, the studies support
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our general point that political parties not only face a trade-off between talking
about Europe or national issues in election campaigns but by contrast they also
face the choice of talking about different types of European issues. Second, it seems
that EU policies are more salient in direct party communication (i.e. in manifestos
or press releases) than in mass media-filtered communication. Finally, the extent to
which EU policies are addressed varies across countries and parties – although
we lack more systematic evidence on this point given the rather limited samples
covered by the studies cited.
What do we expect regarding the salience of Europe in EP elections based on
this evidence? First of all, we assume that policy-related topics make up a signifi-
cant portion of all European issues, given that we focus on: (a) direct party com-
munication by means of election manifestos and (b) EP elections, which have
become ever more important in EU policy-making over time. To put it differently,
where if not in Euromanifestos should domestic parties discuss the way Europe
intervenes in daily policy-making? As a consequence, we expect that the overall
salience of Europe in party competition in EP elections is much higher than has
been shown by previous studies (Fazekas et al., 2015; Spoon, 2012). It might not
seem surprising that parties choose to focus on European issues in general and EU
policies in particular in their Euromanifestos. However, note that our predictions
contrast with ones that regard EP elections as (still) second-order elections fought
in the shadow of national political conflicts and issues (Reif and Schmitt, 1980;
Schmitt, 2005).
The ‘why’: EU positions, intra-party dissent and polarization
Inspired by the work of Schattschneider (1960), theories on the dynamics of issue
competition have posited that political parties will focus on different issues in a way
that benefits them electorally. As Carmines (1991: 75) aptly puts it, ‘All successful
politicians instinctively understand which issues benefit them and their party and
which do not’. A major claim in this literature is that parties emphasise issues on
which they hold distinct and strong positions which offer them an advantage
over their competitors (for a recent formulation, see de Vries and Hobolt, 2012;
Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). Translated to European issues, most contributions
to the debate expect political parties to profit the most from emphasizing
Europe in their discourse if they have: (a) a clear Euro-critical position and
(b) face no major intra-party dissent over Europe (e.g. de Vries and van de
Wardt, 2011; Kriesi, 2007; Spoon, 2012; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Whitefield
and Rohrschneider, 2015). By challenging the pro-European consensus of main-
stream parties and the political elite more generally, Euro-critical parties are seen as
the strongest force driving the salience of Europe in party politics. The dominant
role of Eurosceptics in integration conflicts is explained not the least by the fact
that European issues cut across the traditional left-right dimension (e.g. Hooghe
et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008), thus producing severe intra-party conflict
within mainstream parties (e.g. Franklin et al., 1996). For this reason, mainstream
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parties are expected to dismiss such issues with the aim of neutralizing internal
conflicts.
These expectations reflect the state of the art in the literature. However, as we
said in the introduction, they were mainly developed and tested in relation to strug-
gles over Europe in general and over its constitutive aspects in particular. Given
parties’ general positioning on the further integration of Europe, these issues can be
characterized as ‘wedge issues’ (van de Wardt et al., 2014), with all the potential to
restructure political competition. However, conflicts over policy-related European
issues do not necessarily follow the same logic because parties’ positions on these
issues usually do not cross but are instead embedded in the dominant left-right
divide (Hix et al., 2007). Therefore, debating policy-related European issues does
not tend to pose the same threat to the internal cohesion of mainstream parties and
can more easily be accommodated by them. As Börzel and Risse (2009: 219) argue,
‘European mass integration parties of the centre-left and centre-right could actually
profit from politicization, the more Europeans stop fighting over the European
finalité politique and start debating what kind of European policies they would
prefer’ (see also Risse, 2010: 249–252). This reasoning implies that, especially in
the context of EP elections, pro-European and internally divided political parties
should attempt to shift attention away from constitutive debates over the further
deepening and widening of Europe. However, this de-emphasizing strategy should
not come at the expense of talking about Europe altogether. Instead, we expect that
parties will emphasize European policies in their manifestos. That is, they will
elaborate on how the EU should make use of its competencies in daily policy-
making – for example, by adapting EU regulations to stimulate economic growth
or tightening EU rules to protect the environment.
Party positions on European integration
H1a: The more Euro-critical parties are, the more they will emphasize constitutive
European issues in their EP election manifestos.
H1b: The less Euro-critical parties are, the more they will emphasize policy-related
European issues in their EP election manifestos.
Intra-party dissent over European integration
H2a: The less parties are internally divided on EU issues, the more they will emphasize
constitutive European issues in their EP election manifestos.
H2b: The more parties are internally divided on EU issues, the more they will empha-
size policy-related European issues in their EP election manifestos.
Apart from party-level factors, we also expect systemic characteristics to differently
impact on the salience of the two types of EU issues. Ultimately, the challenge
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posed by Euro-critical forces should increase polarization over European integra-
tion in the party system as a whole and, thus, affects the competitive context faced
by all parties in the system (see Meijers, 2015). Also, the more parties differ in their
EU positions, the more likely voters will be to vote on the basis of these positions
(e.g. de Vries, 2007). In turn, this should offer further strategic incentives to parties
to publicly emphasize these differences. As argued, Euro-critical parties will
attempt to focus attention on differences regarding constitutive issues and rarely
talk about EU policies, whereas the ‘Europhiles’ would ideally put most emphasis
on policy-related European issues. However, when faced with sizable Euro-critical
parties, it gets more likely that they are forced into talking about constitutive issues
as well. Therefore, we expect that both party-level factors and polarization over
Europe in the party system have different effects on the salience of the two types of
issues. The focus on policy issues should be more pronounced in a context where
parties disagree less on the fundamentals of integration. By contrast, the salience of
constitutive issues should be greater in contexts characterized by high levels of
polarization over European integration. Again, note that we do not expect that
decreasing polarization leads to less emphasis on Europe in party manifestos but
rather to increasing emphasis on European policies.
Polarization over European integration
H3a: The more polarized the party system is over European integration, the more
parties will emphasize constitutive European issues in their EP election manifestos.
H3b: The less polarized the party system is on European integration, the more parties
will emphasize policy-related European issues in their EP election manifestos.
Data and methods
Our dependent variables are defined as emphasis on two major types of European
issue mentioned in election manifestos issued ahead of EP elections. To measure
these dependent variables, we use information from the Euromanifestos Project
(EM). The EM data cover party manifestos of all the relevant parties issued
ahead of EP elections from 1979 to 2009.3 As the EM project coded manifestos
for EP elections and not for national elections, the original coding scheme of the
Comparative Manifesto Project has been adapted accordingly (Wüst and Volkens,
2003). Although some criticism has been raised vis-a-vis the usage of manifesto data
in general (Mikhaylov et al., 2012), we are convinced that in the case of our under-
taking, the EM data source is unique and highly appropriate. The advantages out-
weigh shortcomings as e.g. the fact that we ‘only’ cover official party statements,
although we will discuss the impact of the chosen data source critically in the
concluding section of the article. Most importantly for our purpose, the data
cover many issue categories related to the political system of the EU and a variable
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called ‘governmental frame’. This frame variable lists the policy level to which an
argument in a sentence refers. The variable has four categories: national, European,
global or unspecified. For example, a coder would assign a European frame to the
following statement, ‘[t]he EU has taken the lead on action to deal with climate
change’. By contrast, ‘[w]e will resist efforts by Labour to push through Heathrow
expansion’ clearly refers to national politics and is therefore coded accordingly (the
two examples are taken from the Euromanifesto of the British Conservative Party in
2009). Note that the European political level is used by the coders when the gov-
ernmental frame of the content explicitly refers to the European level.
The two innovations mentioned above allow us to distinguish between consti-
tutive and policy-related European issues in a Euromanifesto (on the concepts, see
Bartolini, 2005; Schmitt, 2007). Constitutive issues cover all categories related to
the fundamental features of the EU’s political system, such as the competencies of
different European institutions, membership issues or questions related to the legit-
imacy or complexity of the EU (The online appendix provides detailed information
on the assignment of the various coding categories). Policy-related issues, by con-
trast, refer to questions about how European institutions should use their compe-
tencies in policy making. Typical examples in this regard are categories related to
economic policies, foreign special relationships, environmental protection or immi-
gration. For these categories, our categorization effort benefited from the inclusion
of the governmental frame variable. In other words, we only coded statements as
policy-related European issues when coders assigned the European political level as
the governmental frame. Due to the expanding competencies of the EC/EU over
time, the assignment of some issue categories depends on the year in which they
were raised. To illustrate, we treat support or opposition towards the European
Single Market as a constitutive issue until the implementation of the Single
European Act in 1987. After that, such statements are classified as policy-related
(see the online appendix). In the end, our dependent variables are the sum of
positive and negative mentions of either constitutive or policy-related European
issues as a percentage of all the coded quasi-sentences in a manifesto.
To operationalise our independent variables, we draw on the well-known Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2012; Ray, 1999; Steenbergen et al.,
2007). For indicators of parties’ general positions towards European integration
and party system polarization (H1, H2 and H3), we use the ‘position’ variable from
the CHES data set. By taking this variable indicating a party’s support or oppos-
ition towards the EU from another independent data source, we avoid the problem
that the positional variables are created from the salience measure used as our
dependent variable.4 Party system polarization is calculated according to Esteban
and Ray’s (1994) index. This indicates how much parties’ EU positions differ from
each other and takes into account the size of a given party (as measured by its vote
share). Moreover, in this article, we address recent calls to systematically distin-
guish the effects of polarization from simple positional divisions (see Esteban and
Ray, 1994; Esteban and Schneider, 2008; Indridason, 2011). In contrast to polar-
ization, which takes into account the position and size of all competitors, divisions
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refer to the greatest distance in EU positions between the most extreme parties in
the system regardless of their size. Finally, to measure intra-party dissent on
European issues, we use the ‘dissent’ indicator provided by the CHES data (H2).
As one might assume a curvilinear relationship between intra-party dissent and the
salience of European issues, we decide to take into account two variables, both the
single and the squared term (see Steenbergen and Scott, 2004).
Moreover, with an eye to previous research (in particular Spoon, 2012) we also
take into account some additional control variables in our model, namely public
opinion on Europe, party size, government status and party family. In the case of
public opinion, we draw on data from the European Election Study and
Eurobarometer to measure ambivalence5 in citizens’ attitudes to EU integration.
Party size is measured as the party’s vote share in the last national elections.
Government status indicates whether the party was part of the national govern-
ment at the time of a given EP election. We use the party family as indicated in the
EM data, generating dummy variables for green, regional and nationalist parties.
The online appendix provides detailed descriptions of the operationalization, data
sources and descriptive values.
To identify the determinants of European constitutive and policy issues in EP
party manifestos, we use Prais–Winsten regression analysis. We decide to use this
technique instead of a time-series cross-sectional analysis with a lagged dependent
variable and panel-corrected standard errors (as proposed by Beck and Katz, 1995;
applied by Spoon, 2012) because the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
‘tends not only to absorb large parts of the trend in the dependent variable, but
likely biases estimates’ (Plümper et al., 2005). Moreover, and in line with Spoon
(2012), we take two important decisions regarding the model specification. First,
we cluster the standard errors by party because it seems unlikely that a party’s
manifestos are written independently of each other. Second, we include our inde-
pendent variables as lagged variables because the writing process of a party mani-
festo starts about a year before the election in question (Däubler, 2012; Dolezal,
2012). Due to our use of the CHES data, we have a kind of natural lag which is
smaller than that had we taken the five-year lag between two consecutive EP
elections.6
Before starting with the empirical analysis, it seems important to spend some
lines on the unit of observation and the case selection. The unit of observation is one
party per country and year represented by one manifesto issued ahead of an EP
election. Altogether, the number of observations per country pooled for all elec-
tions ranges from 10 (Italy) to 55 (Belgium). The EM data set comprises a total
number of 624 European party manifestos in 27 EU member states and seven
elections (1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009). For the following reasons,
the final number of cases is reduced for our analysis to N(party)¼ 401 and
N(country)¼ 14 (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France,
Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and
Ireland).7 First, we opt to exclude the countries that joined the EU in the 2000s
since we are interested in the longer term evolution and want to compare our
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results to the existing literature (e.g. de Vries and van de Wardt, 2011; Spoon, 2012;
Steenbergen and Scott, 2004). In addition, the party systems in central and eastern
European countries are still considered less stable when it comes to EP elections
(Schmitt, 2005). Second, as not all party manifestos have been coded due to missing
documents for some early EP elections, we decide to exclude country/election com-
binations from the analysis for which the coded party manifestos represent fewer
than 50% of voters in an election. Third, for some periods, information on our
main independent variables is not available in the CHES data for all parties.
Mapping European issues in Euromanifestos
How much space do parties dedicate to European issues in their Euromanifestos?
To begin with, the results in Table 1 show that European issues (about 75%) are far
more salient than national issues (about 24%) and the share of ‘uncodable’ quasi-
sentences is negligible. Based on the election manifestos, EP elections are about
European issues. This finding contrasts with the standard view of EP elections as
‘second order’ elections fought in the shadow of national politics. By contrast, our
results are in line with recent survey-based research that shows that voters do take
European issues into account when making their voting decisions in EP elections
(e.g. Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009; de Vries and van de Wardt, 2011; Hix and
Marsh, 2011; Hobolt, 2009; Schmitt et al., 2009). Regarding trends over time, one
would expect political actors to have directed more and more attention to
European issues, given the increasing transfers of authority, the inclusion of new
member states and the trend towards ‘constraining dissensus’ in the last decades
(de Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Research based on expert











1979 22.82 (14.12) 51.31 (14.94) 25.44 (10.82) 0.43 (0.76) 25
1984 28.17 (19.00) 49.98 (19.10) 21.45 (9.81) 0.40 (0.72) 30
1989 25.35 (18.63) 58.09 (18.88) 16.15 (9.78) 0.41 (0.59) 40
1994 25.08 (18.04) 54.97 (17.32) 19.45 (9.19) 0.49 (1.29) 67
1999 23.32 (19.53) 56.29 (17.88) 19.73 (9.01) 0.65 (3.39) 81
2004 20.64 (16.12) 59.50 (16.06) 19.56 (10.40) 0.30 (0.79) 79
2009 23.53 (15.49) 59.87 (17.28) 16.02 (11.38) 0.58 (1.29) 79
All 23.66 (17.42) 56.81 (17.49) 19.05 (10.30) 0.49 (1.77) 401
Note: The table shows the average share of European and national issues in the pooled dataset.
Source: Euromanifesto data 1979–2009. See Braun et al. (2015).
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surveys (de Vries and van de Wardt, 2011: 174), mass media content (Hutter and
Grande, 2014: 1010) and parliamentary debates (Rauh, 2015: 128) indicates an
increasing, but non-linear, trend in salience. Based on the authoritative statements
of parties in the context of EP elections, our findings do not support this expect-
ation (Table 1). On average, European issues were as salient in Euromanifestos in
1979 as in 2009.
What do we gain from taking into account both constitutive and policy-related
European issues? First, the descriptive results in Table 1 show that European issues
are much more salient if we consider policy-related discussions. While in Spoon’s
(2012: 561) analysis, the average salience of European issues in Euromanifestos
ranges between 19 and 25%, our findings show that European issues are much
more relevant, with salience at around 75%. This confirms our expectation that EU
policies make up a larger share of all European issues in Euromanifestos than in
direct – and even more so than in mass-mediated – party communications in
national elections (see Guinaudeau and Persico, 2013; Hutter et al., 2016b;
Pennings, 2006; Senninger and Wagner, 2015). Second, there is some increase in
the numbers of policy issues mentioned in the manifestos, whereas the salience of
constitutive issues has instead decreased over time. More precisely, we observe a
higher share of policy issues in all campaigns from 1994 onwards as compared to
the first two EP elections in 1979 and 1984. In a way, this is good news, given
Mair’s (2000) normative argument on what should be discussed in the context of
EP elections.
How to explain the salience of European
issues in EP election manifestos?
In the explanatory part of our empirical analysis, we run three different models: the
first has the share of constitutive European issues as dependent variable (CON), the
second has policy-related European issues (POL) and the third the overall share of
European issues (EU). Each of these models is built up stepwise. In the first step
(Main Model), we introduce our expected main determinants of EU issue salience
to single out the effect of party position towards the EU, the degree of intra-party
dissent and the polarization in the party system while controlling for party division
(hypotheses 1–3). In the next step, we extend this Main Model by introducing
further control variables. In Control Model I, we account for public opinion
towards the EU and the size and government status of each party as this has an
impact on parties’ involvement in European politics and thus might affect our
findings. In Control Model II, we take into account party families to see whether
the effect on EU issue salience of a party’s position on Europe can be attributed to
specific party families as shown in Spoon’s (2012) study.8
The results presented in Table 2 indicate that the more Euro-critical parties are,
the more they tend to put emphasis on constitutive European issues in their EP
election manifestos (supporting hypotheses 1). By contrast, neither intra-party dis-
sent (H2) nor party polarization (H3) have a statistically significant effect on the
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salience of constitutive European issues. It seems that specific party positions
matter most in explaining this type of EU issue emphasis in EP elections. The
finding that party positions matter corresponds with studies that rely on expert
surveys (e.g. de Vries and van de Wardt, 2011; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004;
Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015). However, for party position towards
Europe we need to mention that the effect is at a rather low level of statistical
significance (p< 0.10) in both the Main Model and in Control Model I, and
although the effect is still positive in Control Model II it is no longer statistically
significant.9 Instead, two party family indicators result in statistically significant
effects: Green parties tend to put less emphasis on constitutive European issues,
while the opposite is true for parties belonging to the nationalist party family. This
offers further support for our first hypothesis: Euro-critical parties – in the first two
models indicated by a critical EU position and in the third model introduced simply
via the nationalist party family – put more emphasis on constitutive issues.
We observe striking differences if we turn to policy-related European issues. First
of all, our results show that the less Euro-critical parties are, the more likely they
are to emphasize European policy issues in Euromanifestos (H1). The same can be
observed for party polarization (H3). The more polarized the party system is over
Europe, the less parties tend to emphasize European policies in their manifestos. In
other words, EU policy issues are more likely to be emphasized by Euro-friendly
parties and in an environment that is less polarized over European matters. This
finding provides strong support for our claim that the dynamics of EU issue com-
petition are fundamentally different when we look at EU policies. Pro-European
forces have far less to lose – or, according to Börzel and Risse (2009), might even
benefit – from focusing the debate on EU policies. These two effects remain stable
in all the models even when taking into account the two sets of control variables –
again, there is no significant effect of intra-party dissent on EU issue emphasis
(disconfirming H2). This time, two interesting effects appear within the control
models. First, public opinion on Europe matters for the salience of EU policy
issues. The less ambivalent public opinion is over Europe, the more parties tend
to emphasize European policies in their manifestos. Spoon (2012: 570) interprets
the opposite effect in her results (but with constitutive European issues as depend-
ent variable) as indicating that parties may not be responsive to voters. Our results
suggest the opposite: if the public takes a clear stance on European integration,
parties tend to focus more on policy-related EU issues. Second, the nationalist
party family again has an impact on EU issue emphasis. The negative effect dis-
played in Table 2 (Control Model II) signifies that nationalist parties tend to put
less emphasis on European policy issues. However, this time the negative effect of
EU-criticism remains statistically significant even if we control for party families.
Moreover, the third model including the overall share of European issues (EU)
as dependent variable nicely illustrates the main drivers of EU issue salience in
general. All the main effects are almost identical to the policy models which means
that taking into account policy issues has important implications for our under-
standing of EU issue salience in EP elections. That is, according to our findings,
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Party position over Europe
Figure 1. Link between European issues and party position towards the EU.
Note: The estimations are based on the results gained from the Main Model. Adjusted predictions
with 95% confidence intervals. The Y-axis represents the share of constitutive or policy issues in a
Euromanifesto per country and election (constitutive issues range from 0 to 75%; policy
issues from 0 to 91%). The X-axis represents the party position towards Europe, ranging from
1 (¼Pro-EU) to 7 (¼Anti-EU).
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Party system polarization over Europe
Figure 2. Link between European issues and party polarization over Europe.
Note: The estimations are based on the results gained from the Main Model. Adjusted predictions
with 95% confidence intervals. The Y-axis represents the share of constitutive or policy issues in a
Euromanifesto per country and election (constitutive issues range from 0 to 75%; policy issues
from 0 to 91%). The X-axis represents party polarization over Europe, ranging from 0 (¼low
degree) to 4 (¼high degree).
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Europe is more likely to be emphasized by pro-European parties and in a party
system that is less polarized over Europe. This is important insofar as the existing
literature mainly offers arguments for why Euro-friendly parties might try to de-
emphasize (constitutive) European issues, but these arguments do not fit well when
trying to explain parties’ different emphases on policy-related European issues.
Obviously, the initial idea of a need to differentiate among EU issue types
matches the empirical evidence. Our findings clearly show that the salience of
constitutive issues involves different mechanisms to the salience of policy issues.
To illustrate this in more detail, Figure 1 plots the different effects of party position
towards the EU (H1). The graphs show that there is a positive relationship between
the party position towards European integration and the salience of constitutive
issues, whereas we can see a clear negative link in the case of policy issues. Hence,
anti-European parties are less likely to refer to policy issues, while pro-European
parties put much more emphasis on European policies in their manifestos.
Numerically this means that if a party position changes one unit from a pro-
European to an anti-European position, the share of policy issues decreases by
2.45 percentage points; in contrast, the share of constitutive issues increases by
0.82 percentage points. Figure 2 is even more telling when it comes to the dissimilar
patterns between constitutive and policy European issues. The graphs show that
there is no significant relationship between party system polarization (i.e. the dis-
tance between parties weighted by party size) towards European integration and
the salience of constitutive issues, whereas we can identify a strong effect in the case
of policy issues. If the polarization of the party system changes one unit from no or
little polarization over Europe to a high degree of polarization, the share of policy
issues decreases by 6.30 percentage points.
Discussion and conclusion
How much and why do political parties emphasize European issues in their appeals
to the public? Our knowledge about the partisan supply in EP elections is still fairly
limited – at least when compared to vote choice in EP elections. EP elections were,
and to a large extent still are, characterized as ‘second order national contests’ in
which domestic concerns trump over European issue contests. However, there is
increasing evidence that European issues play a more important role in both the
demand and supply sides (for a review, see Hobolt, 2015). Our findings support this
latter view to a large extent. Conducting the first large-N empirical study that
systematically distinguishes between polity and policy contestation has allowed
us to reconsider previous findings on the salience of Europe and its driving
forces in EP elections.
We can summarize our main results as follows. First, by distinguishing between
constitutive and policy-related European issues, we have been able to show that
European issues are much more salient in the partisan offer than is often assumed.
Manifestos issued before EP elections are about European issues and, most
importantly, parties discuss the kind of European policies they want at length.
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Thus, based on the programmatic statements of parties, EP elections conform to
the normative standard introduced by Mair (2000, 2007) and Risse (2010). They
are about European policy-making and do not primarily focus on the fundamen-
tals of the EU polity or purely domestic questions. Second, the two types of
European issues are salient under different conditions. Different dynamics are
at play depending on the kind of European issue at stake. The party position
on European integration is highly relevant: if a party takes a more Euro-critical
position, it is more likely to highlight constitutive issues in its Euromanifesto,
whereas Euro-friendly parties tend to put more emphasis on policies. Moreover,
in contexts characterized by less polarized conflicts over European integration, all
parties are more likely to emphasize such EU policies. Overall, this confirms our
expectation that Euro-critical challengers sense the opportuneness of emphasizing
constitutive European issues with all their potential to restructure domestic party
competition. However, at least in their Euromanifestos, pro-European forces do
not shy away from talking about Europe, but they emphasize another type of
Europe by debating the way Europe does (and should) intervene in daily policy-
making.
Altogether, our study has provided new insights for the understanding of EU
issue competition. First, and most importantly, we have been able to demonstrate
the importance of distinguishing between different types of European issues. Of
course, this raises further questions about comparisons to other arenas. Is the
salience of policy and constitutive issues comparable in manifestos and public
debates? Why is it that although European policies are very salient in
Euromanifestos they do not seem to make it into the media (Adam and Maier,
2011; Dolezal, 2012; Schuck et al., 2011)? In this context, future research should
examine what role party strategies and the media logic play in explaining these
differences. Moreover, we need more research on the question of how much we can
generalize from manifesto data, or to put it in common terms: What are the dif-
ferences between the several data sources exploited for research questions on issue
salience – e.g. namely manifesto data, public debates and expert surveys. Second,
the negative effect of polarization on the salience of policy-related European issues
merits further investigation. It might indicate that in EP elections Euro-critical
forces can prevent more salient debates over EU policies, which supports recent
work on the contagion effect of Euroscepticism on mainstream competitors
(Meijers, 2015). Moreover, our closer look at the polarization-salience nexus
offers interesting insights for the literature on the politicization of Europe too.
Debating European policies is more likely in contexts characterised by fewer
fundamental integration conflicts. However, in such contexts, we might not neces-
sarily observe less politicization but different manifestations of politicization.
Finally, our results point to some degree of normalization of EU issue competition
as European policies have become more salient relative to constitutive issues in
the post-Maastricht period. However, our study has only made a first step and
more work is needed to explain the pronounced variation over time and across
countries. In sum, there is much to discover if we take Marks’s (2004: 241) advice
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seriously: ‘European integration is diverse [. . .]. It depends on what issue one is
talking about’.
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Notes
1. In the Chapel Hill Survey, experts are asked to rate the ‘relative importance of European
integration in the party’s public stance’ on a five-point scale, ranging from ‘no import-
ance, never mentioned’ to ‘most important issue for the party’ (Bakker et al., 2012).
2. Pennings (2006) finds that fewer than 10% of the explicit co-mentions per policy domain
refer to European integration. However, as he notes, the automated procedure is rather
restrictive, which might have led to underestimation of the degree of Europeanization in
national party manifestos.
3. Unfortunately, data for the 2014 EP election is not available so far.
4. However, note that our key findings are the same if we rely on EM data, i.e. the position
variable created by subtracting negative from positive references to the constitutive issues
listed in the online appendix.
5. This variable thus maps whether the respondents have a clear-cut (positive or negative)
opinion towards the EU, or are ambivalent over Europe. We assume that a non-ambig-
uous (good or bad) evaluation of the EU leads to higher levels of party-based EU issue
salience since parties attempt to address their voters’ positions on the issue.
6. For H1, H2 and H3, for the 2009 EP elections, we therefore take CHES data from
2006 (and according to the same logic for 2004 we take 2002; for 1999, 1996; for 1994,
1992; for 1989, 1988; and for 1979 & 1984, 1984). Unfortunately CHES data is only avail-
able starting from 1984. However, the online appendix (robustness check), where we pre-
sent the results for the Main Model without data from 1979, shows quite similar results.
7. As a matter of fact, the number of Euromanifestos varies over time for a single country.
For instance, in the German case, our data set includes seven observations for the Social
Democrats – one observation per election (1979–2009), whereas data for the Austrian
‘Liste Hans-Peter Martin’ are only available for one election (2009), for the Portuguese
CDU for two elections (2004, 2009) and for the Greek Syriza for three elections (1999,
2004 and 2009).
8. In addition to these models we perform a large set of different robustness checks for
our Main Model (see the online appendix) to demonstrate the stability of our results.
We check whether the results remain stable if we drop the 1979 election and run our
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model with a classical Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with panel-corrected standard
errors and a lagged dependent variable. Moreover, we run some fixed effects models and
test a modified version of our two dependent variables. Finally, we take into account the
length of manifestos.
9. When we control for the length of a manifesto the effect for party positions towards
the EU on constitutive European issues is also no longer statistically significant (see the
online appendix). At the same time, we observe that the shorter a manifesto, the more
parties tend to emphasize constitutive issues. Additional tests suggest that, in many
countries, Eurocritical parties tend to produce smaller manifestos for EP elections.
In a way, this supports our claim that Eurocritical parties focus on the key constitu-
tive features of integration and do not discuss the direction of EU policies at length.
However, more research is needed to study the process of how Euromanifestos are
generated and how much Eurocriticism and/or professionalization influence the length
of a manifesto.
References
Adam S and Maier M (2011) National parties as politicizers of EU integration? Party
campaign communication in the run-up to the 2009 European Parliament election.
European Union Politics 12(3): 431–453.
Bakker R, de Vries CE, Edwards E, et al. (2012) Measuring party positions in Europe: The
Chapel Hill Expert Survey trend file, 1999–2010. Party Politics 21(1): 1–15.
Bartolini S (2005) Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political
Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Beck N and Katz JN (1995) What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data.
American Political Science Review 89(3): 634–647.
Börzel TA and Risse T (2009) Revisiting the nature of the beast – Politicization, European
identity, and postfunctionalism. A comment on Hooghe and Marks. British Journal of
Political Science 39(1): 217–220.
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